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The Decline and Fall of AT&T:
A Personal Recollection
Richard A. Posner*
Thank you very much, Chris. I needed a generous introduction
because I realized, listening to the very interesting talks this morning, that I
hadn't thought about telecommunication policy since 1981. I'm a kind of
Rip van Winkle here, invited to give an antiquarian talk.
I was struck by Mr. Weber's very lucid discussion of the history of
telecommunications technology. He made a powerful argument that
everything that's happened in telecommunications policy has been the
result, ultimately, of technological progress, and that the lawyers and the
economists and the judges and the legislators and the bureaucrats are corks
bobbing on the technological waves. So my talk will be not only antiquated
but epiphenomenal. Moreover, it is a talk from memory, and I do not
warrant its complete accuracy.
In the fall of 1967 I left the Solicitor General's office to become
General Counsel of President Johnson's Task Force on Communications
Policy. "General Counsel" was a rather grandiose title for my role-the
entire staff of the task force consisted of no more than five or six persons,
only one other of whom was a lawyer. The staff was under the direction of
a very able young fellow named Alan Novak, a Yale Law School graduate
who was a personal assistant to Eugene Rostow. Rostow, the former Dean
of the Yale Law School, was the Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs and the chairman of the task force. It was noted at the time that the
fact that Rostow had been made chairman of this task force was a testament
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to his unimportance, because the third-ranking official in the State
Department would not be given such a modest and peripheral task if he
were really an important official. All I remember of him is his beautiful
office in the State Department and that he was the best-tailored man I had
ever met. He was elegant and lordly but didn't seem to have anything to
say about telecommunications policy. I do remember that his favorite word
seemed to be "d~marche"--a diplomatic word meaning, actually, just
"statement."
A curiosity that didn't strike me until today is that there didn't seem
to be anyone between Gene Rostow and Staff Director Novak. You'd think
there would be a task force with members and a staff of young people
reporting to it. But there was just Rostow, and he took no interest, as far as
I could tell at any rate, in the project.
There was a fine economist on our staff whom we called the Director
of Research-Leland Johnson-a very good price theorist from Rand who
had achieved a measure of academic celebrity for what was called the
"Averch-Johnson" effect-the incentive of price-regulated firms to
overinvest because their capital costs were not constrained as effectively as
their operating costs. Lee Johnson was excellent, and I learned a lot from
him about price theory.
The task force had a very broad mandate, and much of what we dealt
with had nothing to do with the regulation of AT&T. Cable television was
just emerging from its original, very limited role of overcoming
topographical obstacles to broadcast transmission, but already dreamers
were talking about hundreds of channels and how that plenitude would
transform American culture. We also became involved in intense debate
over pay television-whether allowing it would erode a sense of
community somehow created by free (to the viewer, that is) television. And
we spent much time discussing companies that you've probably never
heard of called "record carriers," obscure common carriers that handled
international telex traffic (telex-another fossil). There were policy issues
concerning them and also concerning satellites-communication satellites
were just coming on line. But we did talk extensively with and about
AT&T, and Bill McGowan, the founder of MCI, came and lobbied us, as of
course did AT&T.
We were skeptical about the social value of AT&T's monopoly of
telephone service, and about common carrier regulation in general. Even
though the 1960s was an era of renewed collectivism-the era of the Great
Society programs-the collectivist impulse somehow coexisted with
skepticism about public utility and common carrier regulation, which
seemed old-fashioned and anticompetitive. That skepticism had arisen in
the 1950s, and in the 1960s George Stigler and other distinguished
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economists published highly critical artizles about regulation. This
skepticism was magnified when one met the regulators and regulatees.
Moreover, hostility toward monopoly was an aspect of the antitrust culture
of the 1950s and 1960s, and antitrust was a "liberal" policy that coexisted
comfortably with the liberal thrust of the Great Society.
I left the task force to join the faculty of the Stanford Law School in
the summer of 1968. I think we had pretty much finished-we the staff at
any rate-the task force's report. But before it was released to the public it
was submitted to the White House and there I think it got diluted in some
ways. The report was finally issued in December of 1968, at the very end
of the Johnson administration; and then Nixon came in. So I don't know
what effect on policy the report had. But the very able engineer on our
staff, Walter Hinchman, became the head of the Common Carrier Bureau
of the FCC, which was already beginning to turn against AT&T, and
Hinchman helped it turn further. What Weber told you in his talk was very
pertinent. New technologies had arisen that facilitated competition, such as
microwave towers for long-distance telephone service, which were much
cheaper than building underground cables.
I also think that AT&T's attitude of never yielding an inch irritated
people, including the officials and staff of the FCC. Hush-a-Phone (a
rubber cup-like device that one attached to the speaking end of the phone
so that other people in the room couldn't hear what you were saying, and
that AT&T claimed was a forbidden "foreign attachment" to the telephone
network) was the famous example of that absurdity. And so in 1968 the
FCC issued the Carterfone decision, which for the first time permitted
"foreign" interconnection with AT&T's network (over AT&T's
objection)--it was just acoustical coupling, but nevertheless the decision
was a portent. The logjam was beginning to break at the FCC, and maybe
the task force report (or just the existence of the task force) had some effect
in encouraging the FCC in its new course.
I had become interested in telecommunications policy as a result of
my work on the task force; the first course I taught at Stanford Law School
was on telecommunications policy. I started writing about regulation, and
published an article in the first issue of Paul McAvoy's Bell Journal of
Regulation on cross-subsidization in regulated industries. Other articles
followed. And then in 1973 the AT&T suit was filed, and shortly after that
I was asked to give a talk in New York, I think mainly to securities
analysts, about the case. I recall saying that the suit seemed like a long
shot-a suit to break up such a large and heavily regulated common carrier.
All of AT&T's services were provided by tariffs approved by the FCC, and
it seemed unlikely that an antitrust suit would be allowed to disrupt this
system of tariffed pricing and limited entry. But of course it turned out that
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the FCC, which became progressively more hostile to AT&T, was happy to
allow the antitrust suit to proceed, and it made sure that it didn't create
regulatory obstacles to the suit by approving exclusionary tariffs.
At the end of my talk to the analysts, an AT&T lawyer came up to
me-I think it was Harold Levy, who was the senior AT&T lawyer on the
case under AT&T's general counsel, Mark Garlinghouse-and asked me
whether I might be interested in consulting for AT&T on the case. So I
said: sure, why not? I was interested in telecommunications policy and I
was pleased at the thought of making some welcome money consulting.
That began what became a pretty heavy involvement in the case for a
period of about four years. But oddly, I don't remember a great deal about
those four years of consulting. I think the reasons are that most of my work
consisted of attending meetings in New York (though I must have written
memos before and after the meetings, but I don't remember any of that and
I have no copies) and that the meetings were always the same.
There were two major law firms involved on AT&T's side of the
case-Dewey Ballantine and Sidley & Austin. George Saunders, then a
youngish partner at Sidley and extremely able and colorful, was the
principal outside lawyer. He attended all these meetings as did lawyers
from AT&T, usually led by Harold Levy. In addition, AT&T formed
something called "Administration D," a gigantic in-house paralegal and
support apparatus, bursting with engineers and functionaries of all sorts.
The reason the meetings were so repetitious, which is why they're
such a blur in my memory, was captured in a joking comment that George
Saunders used to make to me about Will Baumol, the principal economic
adviser for AT&T on the case-a very distinguished economist then at
Princeton, very articulate, and a regular participant in the meetings. George
used to say: "You know, Baumol has made a great deal of money by telling
AT&T that two plus two is four. If you then take away two, you're back to
two. But if you add one, you then have three. And if you double it you've
got six. And if you then divide by three .... ." What he meant was that
Baumol (and George and I and others, as well) would explain in these
meetings over and over again the very most basic elements of regulatory
economics-economies of scale and scope, cream skimming, vertical
integration with nonregulated entities (such as Western Electric, the
manufacturing arm of the Bell System), limitations on entry, and so forth.
The audience--the AT&T lawyers and engineers-was stubbornly
unreceptive. They didn't like this stuff, and they didn't understand it. So it
had to be repeated to them over and over again.
One thing that struck me early on was that AT&T did not match my
impression of a private company. It reminded me of the government; I had
been in the government for several years before becoming an academic.
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AT&T was very bureaucratic. And, remarkably, it didn't seem to have any
interest in customers. It didn't like competition; that was clear. But more
fundamentally, there didn't seem to be any entrepreneurial spirit. I didn't
know much about private companies, but this was certainly not what I
expected.
AT&T believed for example that nobody should be permitted to
interconnect with the network except GT&E and a couple of other small
vassal-like telephone companies that were also permitted to interconnect
with it. In particular there must be no interconnection by MCI, AT&T's
bte noir, and no attachment of terminal equipment by customers (that is,
no "foreign attachments"). That was AT&T's absolute line of defense: not
one step backwards, as Stalin said when the Germans were approaching
Stalingrad.
We told AT&T that it would have to be able to give reasons for its
position to a court. We heard three reasons, or at least that's all that I
remember. The first was that if someone bought his own piece of terminal
equipment, attached it to the network, and sent a powerful electric current
through it, a telephone lineman working many miles away might be
electrocuted. I don't know whether that was even a theoretical possibility.
When we asked whether there had ever been an accident of that sort, the
AT&T engineers said no. But it could always happen; there could always
be a first time. As far as I know, there's still never been such an accident,
because the power that goes through the phone lines is very low. A big
surge would just blow a fuse rather than cause death by electrocution. So
that argument was a loser.
The next argument they pushed on us involved the Department of
Defense. The Department had asked AT&T to harden its microwave towers
and underground cables, at AT&T's own expense, against a nuclear attack
(to win that nuclear war, we would need survivable communications!). The
Department had also (I think, though my memory is hazy on this point)
pressed AT&T to build another underwater cable, so that Soviet
submarines would have greater difficulty interrupting our global
communications. And so AT&T said: look, MCI is not hardening its
microwave towers. It has these flimsy towers and when the bomb goes off
they're going to be blown down. And it would be unfair therefore to allow
MCI to compete with AT&T because MCI wouldn't incur these
tremendous expenses.
I thought this a dubious point. It seemed strange that a military
measure should be financed by telephone ratepayers rather than by federal
taxpayers. But worse than that, the argument had the odor of conspiracy
between AT&T and the Defense Department: AT&T would finance a
military defense measure so it wouldn't be in the Defense Department's
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budget and in exchange the Defense Department would support AT&T's
monopoly. Military officials testified (and argued inside government, as
they did in trying to get the antitrust case against AT&T dropped) that
AT&T was an integral part of the defense community and must not have its
willingness to invest in defense measures undermined because it would be
competing with companies that didn't incur any of that expense (AT&T
might have been content with the alternative of the FCC's requiring MCI to
harden its facilities, because MCI couldn't have afforded to do that).
AT&T's third argument, and the one it pressed hardest on us, was
related to the electrocution argument; it was that you couldn't trust
customers, whether businesses or individuals, to maintain their terminal
equipment. It was essential that they be required to lease it from Western
Electric. Then AT&T would replace it when it malfunctioned or wore out.
If you let customers attach their own equipment, they'd buy lousy
equipment, not maintain it, and when it broke down, blame the telephone
network, and then AT&T would have to spend a lot of time and money
trying to figure out whether it was an equipment failure or a network
failure. The company didn't want that expense.
So I said to the AT&T lawyers and engineers at one of our meetings:
By the same token, shouldn't manufacturers of television sets refuse to sell
the set but instead lease it only, so that they wouldn't have to worry about
customers who kept it too long or didn't maintain it? And they said: Yes,
probably the television-set manufacturers should do that. And then I said:
Well, taking that a step further, wouldn't it make sense for clothing
manufacturers to refuse to sell clothing but instead just lease it? Suppose a
shirt lasts three years on average before it frays or the buttons fall off-the
manufacturer would lease the shirt to you for three years, at the end of
which time you'd return the shirt and receive a fresh one. At this point the
AT&T engineers realized they were being teased, and they said: No, that
wouldn't make sense. But they couldn't articulate a reason why, with
television sets or telephone equipment, leasing was the way to go but not
with clothing.
So I began to think that while the government's case still looked like a
long shot, the AT&T people didn't seem to have any good reasons that they
could give in support of their position.
At some point during this four-year period I was asked to help
organize a meeting for AT&T at which leading economists would come
and talk about the case with the AT&T legal team. AT&T was already busy
assembling a huge stable of economists as potential witnesses. I think it
may have been part of the AT&Ters' generally favorable attitude toward
monopolization. They thought (I conjecture) that maybe they could
monopolize the economics industry and leave no expert witnesses for the
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Justice Department! So we had this session, in Princeton, and a number of
very good economists attended. George Stigler was one of them, and
George, kind of out of the blue, said to the AT&T people: Of course you're
going to lose the case; the only question is what kind of relief you may be
able to negotiate. I don't remember the reason he gave, but I think it was
something along the lines of: you are so big, you are a monopoly, they're
going to have to find that you violated the Sherman Act. The AT&T people
were really taken aback by this-they knew that George was a very
distinguished economist and also a very conservative one. So I think they
began thinking: Yes, we could lose it. They also started getting negative
signals from Judge Greene, who was presiding over the case in the federal
district court.
My work for AT&T came to a rather abrupt end, I think around 1978.
By this time, I was a member of the company's informal steering
committee for the case. The steering committee held a meeting chaired by
the company's general counsel, Mark Garlinghouse, who I later learned, to
my surprise, had actually wanted to open AT&T up to competition. That
was not the impression he gave at our meetings, but apparently behind the
scenes he was losing faith. At this meeting-there were probably about a
dozen people there, mainly, I think, lawyers--Garlinghouse passed out a
one-page document outlining AT&T's strategy in the case. It said that the
strategy was to delay the litigation-to stretch it out as long as possible.
Garlinghouse asked who agreed that this was the correct strategy. Everyone
agreed except me. And I said (I'm not sure why; I haven't seen the
document since that day thirty or so years ago, because we were told to turn
it in before we left the meeting, but there must have been something in it
beyond just touting the benefits of dragging their heels) that I didn't think
we should adopt this strategy, because this was not an ordinary private
litigation. This was a Department of Justice lawsuit and I feared that we
could be accused of obstruction of justice by adopting a deliberate policy of
delay. That was not a popular suggestion! George Saunders told me later
that Garlinghouse had wanted to fire me, but that George had dissuaded
him. Nevertheless, there was very little demand for my services after that,
which was fine because I had other things to do and also I was worried
about that obstruction of justice issue. I didn't want to be implicated.
My last involvement with the case came in 1981, shortly before I
became a judge. I was summoned to meet with Charles Brown, the CEO of
AT&T, and another person-probably the president of AT&T, but I have
forgotten. Brown told me that AT&T was thinking of making a deal with
the government whereby it would divest itself of the local operating
companies and in exchange would be relieved from the 1956 consent
decree that had forbidden it to go into the computer business. He asked me
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what I thought of such a deal and he reminded me-though this is
something that had been said for a long time, and as far I know was truethat Western Electric's electronic switching systems, installed throughout
the Bell network, were based on the most sophisticated computer
technology in the world. He said we (AT&T) have this sophisticated
computer technology, the computer industry is booming, and so we think
we can-if freed from this incubus (my word I'm sure, not his) of the 1956
decree-be tremendously successful in the computer industry, and so
giving up the local companies would be a fair swap. I replied: I don't think
that will work for you, because what I've noticed over the years is that
AT&T does not have a marketing culture. I remembered from discussions
during the consulting meetings I mentioned how derisive the AT&T people
had been about customers wanting colored telephones. They thought that
was ridiculous. Why on earth would anyone want a colored telephone? I
also remember that I had heard of great dissatisfaction with AT&T on the
part of its business customers, because if they went to AT&T and explained
that they needed a system say for connecting up their offices, AT&T would
say fine, we've studied your needs, this is your system. And they'd reply:
Well, that's fine, but we'd like to see some alternatives, or we'd like to see
something changed here or changed there. And AT&T would say: No,
we've studied your needs, this is your system. That was the attitude; they
did not respect their customers. And this morning we heard about the
instabilities that can afflict a business in which you can't predict your
demand. AT&T did a lot of innovation, but they wanted every new thing to
be introduced gradually, they wanted uniformity not variety, single not
multiple products, and they didn't want customers buffeting them with
demands.
So this was AT&T-a gigantic, bureaucratized company, with a
million employees during the 1970s-and I said to Brown that I did not
think the culture of the company would adapt to the computer industry,
because in that industry, even more than in business telephone services, it's
not enough to have the very best equipment. The really important thing is
to be able to integrate the equipment with the customer's business. Can you
explain it to them? Can you make it usable for them, even if their needs are
idiosyncratic? That didn't sound like AT&T.
I obviously didn't make any impression on Brown. But whether he
really thought that AT&T had a future in the computer industry or whether
he just thought he was going to lose the case because of Judge Greene's
hostility, because of Bill Baxter's extreme hostility, because AT&T had
spent ten years trying to get legislation in Congress to preserve its
monopoly and had failed, I don't know. Anyway, that ended my
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involvement with AT&T. It was lucrative, it was fun, I learned a lot. What
I learned is irrelevant to 2008, but I can't help that.
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